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This paper argues that international trade should affect local organization of production in a systematic 
way. By using the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model we show that the export sector is more 
likely to demonstrate fragmentation, entrepreneurship and outsourcing compared to the import-
competing sector in a typical labor abundant country. Liberal trade regime will promote 
entrepreneurship in general. This is the first elementary proposition. Local outsourcing also establishes a 
clear link between trade and productivity. This is the second elementary proposition. 
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4.  Concluding Remarks Non-Technical Summary 
Conventional wisdom underlying the essence of trade theory talks about the country or firm specific local 
advantages which enable countries and firms to compete successfully in the rest of the world. When trade 
is allowed to take place, certain products and services flourish and some others decay as they are more 
cheaply available and possibly in better qualities from other countries. Seldom one explores how trade 
actually alters the way production is organized within a country. For example how entrepreneurs are 
groomed through trade, how local services, catering to the needs of the export sectors are developed, 
how trade enhances local productivity etc. This paper precisely deals with such issues and shows why 
export sectors are likely to show greater dynamism and local outsourcing in a labour abundant country 
and how such changes help to improve productivity. It also argues why import competing sectors, in spite 
of flourishing in a protected regime, would not exhibit such changes. The mechanism has to do with how 
trade affects cost of capital and volume of production. One interesting point is that the paper uses and 





Fragmentation and outsourcing have been discussed and analyzed extensively in recent 
literature on trade theory. International fragmentation of production and service related 
activities and subsequent outsourcing of such fragments are some of the key issues, which 
have heavily impacted on the policy makers of the developed worlds, primarily in US and 
Europe. These have implication for intra-country income distribution, employment, 
migration, research and development, regulation etc. This paper is an attempt to deliberate on 
a related theme from the perspective of a labour abundant country. A rich trade theoretic 
literature in the last decade handles all such aspects. Papers by Jones & Kierzkowski (2003), 
Deardoff (2001), Jones and Marjit (2001), Marjit (2007), etc discuss the reasons behind 
fragmentation and its implication for pattern of trade, specialization, income distribution and 
development process. Recent papers by Grossman and Helpman (2005) and others deal with 
the issue of outsourcing in terms of heterogeneous firms, incomplete contracts and product 
variety.  
  One emerging area of research is this context seems to be the relationship between 
trade and organization of production. The important question in this context is whether trade 
alters internal production organization in a firm or in an industry. Helpman (2006) and 
Antras (2005b) discuss some of these issues in terms of models with heterogeneous firms, 
trading costs and incompleteness of contracts based on an earlier analysis of Melitz (2003). 
However, so far traditional trade theoretic framework has not been exploited properly to 
address the issue of trade, entrepreneurship and local outsourcing. In this paper we use a 
standard HOS framework to argue why trade will be beneficial for entrepreneurship and local 
outsourcing in a typical labor abundant economy. We also demonstrate that export sectors are 
natural candidates for such experimentation. Capital intensive set up and fixed costs for new 
and small business deter entrepreneurship in general even if some workers can be quite 
productive as entrepreneurs. Declining capital cost and increase in production of the 
exportable make fragmentation and entrepreneurship relatively attractive in the export sector. 
For the import competing sector the favorable cost effect and the scale effect will move 
against each other. In some recent surveys conducted through fieldwork in India [Maiti and 
  1Marjit (2007] it has been observed that international trade leads to separation of production 
and marketing activities. Merchants provide export orders to small fragmented units of 
production. These merchants are mostly producers of bigger firms which were primarily 
engaged in production when the markets were mainly local and national. Such separation and 
specialization of activities have been modeled in a partial equilibrium framework in Maiti 
and Marjit (2008). This paper is a general equilibrium construct and adopts a completely 
different mechanism by focusing directly on cost of capital and scale of production.  
  Jones and Marjit (2001) raised the issue of role of fragmentation in development 
process by noting the fact that more liberal and open regimes are resisted by “older” 
generations because they control the source of capital and education. Vertically integrated 
processes require lumpy capital and “younger” generations can thrive better in world, which 
allows fragmentation and trade in fragments lowering the requirement of capital. We draw 
upon this idea but instead of comparing older and younger generations we take a direct route 
by which more trade reduces cost of capital in a labor abundant economy. 
  This paper is also related to Jones and Marjit (2008), which provide cases where trade 
may lead to greater number of activities relative to autarky even if one observes 
specialization. In this paper greater orientation towards export business will lead to 
diversified fresh activities hitherto contained in the vertically integrated production process 
of the export industry. Typically such an outcome will reflect productivity growth of some 
kind and a regime switch affecting the relationship between commodity prices and factor 
returns. The relationship between my idea and the one popularly discussed in the literature is 
that I focus on heterogeneity of occupations of workers who can either toil as workers within 
in the industry or can set up their own firms. In a way trade creates an environment where 
entrepreneurial talent flourishes. It flourishes because the scale effect is reinforced by capital 
cost cutting effect as export sector expands in a labor-abundant country. Even if one abstracts 
from heterogeneity of firms, moral hazard or adverse selection type problems consistent with 
contractual complexities, the standard workhouse of trade theory is capable enough to 
address this issue. Section 2 develops the model and determines equilibrium. Section 3 looks 
at the effect of trade on fragmentation and outsourcing and analyses the ‘productivity’ impact 
and the last one concludes.  
 
  22. Benchmark Model 
It is a standard   HOS framework with X being the output of the export good and Y that 
of the import-competing good. Each sector uses a different intermediate good, which uses 
only labor and used in fixed proportions with labor and capital. 
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We assume one unit of intermediate is required to produce one unit of final good. While K 
and L are substitutes in the usual neo-classical sense,  and  are not substitutes and 
required in fixed proportions. Intermediates  and  are used in the vertically integrated 
process with some labor devoted to the production of those within the firm. t is the tariff rate. 
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(L, K) are given endowments of labor and capital. We have a small open economy, where 
production technology follows CRS and diminishing marginal productivity. It exports good 
X and imports good Y, X is labor intensive and Y is capital intensive. Since we shall work 
with a fixed set of prices, lets set  1 P P y X = = . Therefore given (t, K, L) we can find out w, 
r, X and Y.  These in turn determine  .   2 1 2 m 1 m M   and   M P P , ,
Some of the workers who produce  and  also have entrepreneurial qualities. If 
they produce it on their own, they can produce with a better technology, such that 
. We assume that n such workers can get together, incur a fixed 
cost of k and thus the total cost of obtaining such inputs from outside are   and 
1 M   M2
my my mx mx a b   and   a b < <
rk X wbmx +
  3rk Y wbmy + , respectively. Therefore firms producing X and Y will like a vertically 
integrated process iff the following holds: 
 













Market structure in the intermediate industry follows “contestability”. Positive profits are 
competed away by free entry and exit assumption. Thus  to be charged by the 
outside entrepreneurs are given by the RHS in (9) and (10). Thus n worker-entrepreneurs get 
together and build up such a firm. Another assumption is that  . This 
implies that a part of the labor effort goes towards pure entrepreneurial supervision. 
2 m 1 m P P ,
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Rewriting (9) and (10) we get, 
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, X and Y all are impacted by t. 
For notational simplicity let us denote ( ) x mx mx d   as    b a −  and ( ) y my my d   as   b a − . 
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If we look at the incentive constraints (13) and (14) more closely, one can easily check that 
liberal trade policies are likely to generate local outsourcing in “both” sectors. While they 
unambiguously do it for the export sector, it is likely that they would do it for the import-
competing sector as well. 
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standard Stolper-Samuelson and price-output response in HOS framework to draw the 
figures 1-5. 
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  6Figure – 3 shows that for low enough tariffs export sector will always go for outsourcing. 
This is the same as figure – 1. Note that as t increases r and Y both increase. Out of four 
possible cases if 
Y
r
 does not decline too fast, outsourcing will be opted by the import-
competing producers where tariffs are relatively low. Thus for lower tariff both sectors will 
go for local outsourcing. We are now ready to propose the following: 
 
Proposition I:  A low enough tariff will lead to generate fragmentation and local 
outsourcing in the in the export sector. If a decline in tariff does not sharply reduce Y 
relative to r, lower tariff will also encourage fragmentation and outsourcing in the 
import-competing sector. 
 
Proof: See the discussion above. 
 
As tariff goes down cost of capital falls in a labor-abundant country and the export-
volume increases. Both are conducive for entrepreneurship to flourish. Workers in spite of 
being more productive as entrepreneurs (dx > 0) cannot open their own business because 
capital is costly. Thus greater trade leads to outsourcing in the export sector.  
                 For the import-competing sector same thing may not happen when t goes up as 
cost of capital and volume of Y both rise at the same time reflecting nothing on the net 
incentive for outsourcing in the sector. However as we have shown as long as  ) (t
Y
r
 does not 
fall too rapidly, the possibility of outsourcing in this sector seems to be greater with a liberal 
trade policies. Thus local outsourcing is encouraged by lower tariff in this sector as well.  
              Once  tariff  clears  a  critical level fragmentation and local outsourcing become 
possible and there is a regime shift in the way production is locally organized. Therefore, one 
needs to solve for the new equilibrium values. We assume that such a switch occurs only in 
the export sector and specify the equilibrium conditions accordingly. We discuss existence of 
such equilibrium in detail in the appendix. 
 
 
  7 
3. Equilibrium with Fragmentation and Outsourcing in the Export Sector 
The new general equilibrium configuration is as follows: 
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n workers gather together and use k as the business set-up cost and supply the intermediate 
input from outside.   Because a part of labor goes towards pure entrepreneurial 
activities beyond production related work. Given (t, w, k,
X b n mx >
L,K ) we determine w, r, X, Y, 
and  from (15) - (20).  1 M 2 M
For each X (t) we can derive another through this process by a function defined as 
)) ( ( t X φ . The solution process implies whether there is a fixed point of the form  
( ) ( ( ))                             Xt Xt ϕ =                    (21) 
 
  As X(t) increases 
r
w
must increase as X is labor-intensive. This is through productivity 
effect in (15). This should imply an increase in X(t) from (17) and (18). These are all 
standard HOS outcomes. Thus  . Existence and uniqueness of X (t) are assumed. 
We are more interested in the consequence of such an outcome on X (t) and factor returns. 
The formal proofs will be worked out later. (See the Appendix) 
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  Figure – 6  
 
                  Note that as long as the tariff is not reduced substantially such fragmentation and 
outsourcing will not take place. However, once tariff reaches the critical threshold the 
process will be activated. Two points we need to highlight here.  
  First, there will be a ‘finite’ change in the process reflecting a jump as workers 
shift themselves from inside to outside factory. Second, this will have a positive productivity 
impact for the X sector. Thus trade will have a distinct productivity impact. Such a growth in 
productivity will affect factor returns immediately. As figure-3 suggests as soon as t is 
lowered beyond a critical level, 
r
w
 jumps up and then again follows a monotonically 
increasing trajectory.  
















It is also expected that 
r
w
 will increase at a sharper rate beyond the critical point as labor-
intensities decline and capital-intensities increase for sector X. Thus the Stolper-Samuelson 
type outcome gets a further boost. 
  Once the average cost of obtaining the intermediate input is directly related to the 
tariff rate, a decline in tariff also means a decline in effective cost of production for the 
export good. This is just like a productivity effect which will increase the wage rate.  
 
Proposition II : Liberal trade regime will reduce the cost of locally outsourced input 
and enhance productivity of labor-abundant country. 
 
Proof: See the discussion above. 
 
  One issue that needs to be addressed is the transition from the state of no-
outsourcing to outsourcing. As we have demonstrated the post-outsourcing equilibrium will 
  10throw up some w and r, call them  . We also know that for outsourcing to be 
profitable we must have 
2 2 r    and    w
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k r
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 Suppose  (  are such that strict equality holds for (22). Then there 
should not be any productivity effect of outsourcing. In the new equilibrium w and r will 
remain the same. With strict inequality w will increase and r will fall and the workers have 
incentive to set up their own business. An element of bargaining may be latent here if 
entrepreneurs form a syndicate and bargain for the reservation price of the intermediate in 
case there is no outsourcing. In our structure   implying part of the labor effort 
goes towards specific entrepreneurial activities. The extent of such labor is given by   
( ), net of labor used for production. A decline in n will reflect improvement in 
entrepreneurial talent. This has usual general equilibrium implications. A fall in n will, via 
Rybczynski effect, increase output of X and reduce that of Y. Again this will have 
productivity effect acting through 
) ) ( , t X r   , w 2 2
X b n mx >
X b n mx −
) (t X
rk
 and raising w and reducing r via Stolper-Samuelson 
outcome. 
  Two issues need to be highlighted here: 
First, in case the intermediate input is a traded input, fragmentation and outsourcing do not 
provide any extra benefit to the sector producing X except that some productive 
entrepreneur-workers locate themselves out of the industry. Further decline in t will increase 
wage via Stolper-Sameulson effect, but will not confer any additional productivity benefit. 
The fact that the price of the intermediate can fall, provides the extra productivity boost. 
Second, we have assumed that in the post-outsourcing the input is available at the average 
cost. But that may not be the case. The equilibrium price may be a contracted price. But such 
a price must be a positive function of the average cost and to that extent a rise in X will 
reduce the price of the intermediate input. 
 
 
  114.  Concluding Remarks 
Contemporary research in theory of international trade puts a lot of emphasis on the 
interaction between international trade and organization of production such as fragmentation 
and outsourcing. While heterogeneity of firms within an industry opens up huge reservoir of 
possibilities where different firms choose different modes of operations, even within the 
ambit of the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson type set up the export sector can be a natural domain 
for outsourcing related activities. We focus on indigenous outsourcing and entrepreneurship 
and formalize the crucial link between trade and productivity. 
               If  is the initial price, the export firms were willing to pay and the entrepreneurs 
can provide the service at a lower cost, who will grab the difference? In our framework such 
difference helps all workers through a rise in w. But ideally it must generate a special class of 
worker-entrepreneurs. In this context sector-specific skill is a better way to capture the 
essence of the problem. Thus imperfect competition, heterogeneity of workforce, sector-
specific skills all are possible domains of further works. Also simultaneous outsourcing in 
export and import competing sector will be a welcome exercise. Contractual complexities are 
also important. To outsource activities one needs to think of monitoring and provision of 
optimal contracts depending on the informational problem. Such work is becoming popular 
in trade theory, but not in terms of the standard text book model of trade. Such issues are 
discussed at length in Helpman (2006) in models of product differentiation and heterogeneity 
of firms. But similar scopes are available in the more conventional models of trade theory. 
This is the key point of the paper. 
m P
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  13Appendix 
 
Existence of an Outsourcing Equilibrium in the export sector 
 
Let the initial no-outsourcing situation generates ( ) as equilibrium outcomes. 
The new equilibrium with outsourcing is represented by (
o , o o o Y X , r , w
Y X r w , , , ). 
  Equation (15) - (21) determine the equilibrium and (22) must hold (with   
replaced by  and  replaced by w and  by r). Let us define  
1 w




wb = +   
 
Outsourcing, as argued in the paper, is caused by a decline in t, with n and k jumping from an initial 
value of zero to some positive number. The new equilibrium must be such that (22) holds with strict 
inequality. 
The proof of existence proceeds as follows.  
Step I.  Find the effect of n > 0, k > 0 and a declining t on X and the condition that  ] ˆ [ . ˆ
x
dx
x   0 x ≡ >  
Step II. Find out the effect on   and the condition that    mx P . ˆ 0 Pmx <
Working with (15) – (21) and using Jones (1965) it is easy to check that  
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where  ) ( Ky y Ly Kx x Lx x θ σ λ + θ ασ λ = δ  and   have usual interpretation.  is 
adjusted by   to reflect the fact that M is used in fixed proportions with labor and capital in 
X.   is share of n in total L and  is share of k in total K.   
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Note that  0 > θ ,  0 > λ  as X is labor intensive. (2A) captures the following. 
(a) The first term is nothing but formal representatives of (21). For 
stability 1 1 K x <
λ θ
θ δ
− . The fixed point is derived on the transformed space   rather 
than on X.  is share of capital in the unit cost of the intermediate. 
X ˆ
K θ
(b)   implies  , as well as  .  0 T < ˆ 0 r w > − ) ˆ ˆ ( 0 X > ˆ
(c)   and  have opposite effects on  .  0 n > ˆ 0 k > ˆ X ˆ
(d) If  and  are negligible i.e. n and k are small relative to total K and L, we have   3 L λ 3 K λ























As t goes down, even if workers leave the export sector to become entrepreneurs and capital is 
released from production for setting up the business, X will rise in equilibrium. From (3A) we can 
stipulate that following is a set of sufficient conditions under which  > 0.  X ˆ
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(t) s.t      w   t     > ∃ . 
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